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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it failed to follow the precedent of

Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 122 P.3d 521, 2005 UT 4 (Utah 2005).
This issue was preserved for appeal in various pleadings submitted to the trial
court and in oral argument. (R. 381—83, Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr." 911-16).
The standard of review for this issue is "correctness".
2.

Whether Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994),

fails to provide an appropriate analytical framework under which a court can determine
whether city council action is administrative or legislative in nature.
This trial was all about application of the Marakis factors to the referendum
sought by Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. and Jim F. Lundberg.

On this issue

appellants ask that the Court revisit the analytical framework which it adopted in
Marakis.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that under the four-part

analysis set forth in Marakis, the general purpose and policy of the newly enacted PD-2
zone in Mapleton City fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1
zone, such that creation of that new zone classification constitutes an administrative
rather than a legislative function of the Mapleton City Council and thus is not referable.
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This issue was preserved for appeal throughout the course of the six days of trial,
in the pretrial and post-trial briefing and at closing arguments. Representative of this is
the post-trial memorandum. (R. 371-81).
Appellants attack certain of the court's factual findings, which factual findings
will only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. The trial court's application of the
law to those facts is evaluated on a "correctness" standard.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
1.

Article V I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2)(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under
the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of
the county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided
by statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601, et seq.

3.

Mapleton Municipal Ordinances :
a. Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element, adopted by Ordinance 200721 (Add. 16).
b. Mapleton City General Plan 2007 Map, adopted by Ordinance 2007-21 (Add.
20).
c. Mapleton Municipal Code, Chapter 180.30, CE-1 Critical Environment Zone
(Add. 21).
d. Mapleton Municipal Code, Chapter 180.78 PD Planned Development Zones
(Add. 81).
e. Ordinance 2007-17, PD-2 Zone Ordinance (Add. 39).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision by the Honorable Darold J. McDade in which he

concluded that the general purpose and policy of a newly enacted zoning classification,
the PD-2 zone, fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1 zone.
Judge McDade concluded that the adoption of the PD-2 zone was an administrative act of
the Mapleton City Council and thus not subject to appellants' proposed referendum
petition by which appellants sought to have the adoption of the PD-2 zone ordinance
submitted to the voters of Mapleton City.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellants Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. and Jim F. Lundberg (collectively

"Friends") filed a Verified Complaint on October 15, 2007, seeking a temporary
restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Appellee Mapleton
City ("Mapleton" or "City") from implementing a zoning change on certain real property
(the "Gibby Property") owned by the Appellees/Intervenors (collectively "Gibby"). (R.
597).

Friends alleged that Mapleton's PD-2 zone, created as a site-specific zone

expressly for the Gibby Property, was subject to a referendum vote of the citizens of
Mapleton, and that until such vote occurred, Mapleton and Gibby were precluded from
implementing the PD-2 zone or developing the Gibby Property pursuant to that zone
classification. (R. 597-96). The only relief sought in the complaint was injunctive
relief. (R. 596). On the morning of October 15, 2007, Judge Claudia Laycock issued a
temporary restraining order against Mapleton. (R. 596).
3

On his motion Gibby was allowed to intervene in the proceedings as the Gibby
Property was at issue. (R. 596).

Thereafter he filed an answer to the complaint.

Mapleton filed an answer and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief on the issues of
whether the challenged ordinance is referable and whether Plaintiffs gathered a
sufficient number of signatures to place the matter on the ballot. (R. 596).
On Mapleton's motion, and after discussion among the parties and Court at an
October 31, 2007, hearing, the parties stipulated that the preliminary injunction hearing
and permanent injunction hearing/trial on the merits would be combined, and that the
temporary restraining order issued on October 15, 2007, would remain in effect pending
the conclusion of the trial. Thereafter the parties conducted expedited discovery. (R.
596).
Trial of the case started before Judge Fred Howard on November 21, 2007. (R.
596). During the presentation of evidence Judge Howard became aware of a potential
conflict of interest, disclosed it to the parties and counsel on the record, and, at
Friends' request, recused himself. (R. 596). The case then was assigned to Division
10, Judge Darold J. McDade. (R. 596).
Judge McDade held five more days of trial on December 5, 7, 12, 13, and 14, 2007,
and the parties stipulated that the testimony of Camille Brown, City Recorder, given on
November 21 before Judge Howard's recusal, would be used in transcript form at trial. (R.
595). The parties presented witnesses, exhibits, and legal briefs and written arguments
to the Court. (R. 595). The Court heard oral arguments on January 18, 2008, (R. 595) and
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issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 15, 2008. This
appeal followed after the issuance of that Order.
C.

STATEMENT OF V \( TS
Most of the trial court's findings of fact are not in dispute in this appeal, Friends

here sets forth those facts which they do not dispute, all of which are contained in the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact:
1.

Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. is a Utah not for profit corporation located

in Utah County, Utah. Jim Lundberg is an individual residing in Mapleton City, Utah
County, Utah. (R. 595).
2.

Mapleton City is a municipal corporation and political subdivision of the

State of Utah. It is incorporated as a city of the third class and has adopted a six-member
council form of government whereby the mayor and council form a unified governing body
that jointly exercises both legislative and executive powers. (R. 595).
3.

Wendell and Trudy Gibby and MCBRS, LLC, own approximately 118 acres

of land along a small portion of the east bench of Mapleton City which has historically
been zoned as Critical Environmental (CE-1) pursuant to Chapter 18.30 of the Mapleton City
Code. (R.595-94).
4.

The CE-1 zone classification allows reasonable residential development of

property taking into account the unique features and characteristics of such property. (R.
594).
5.

Over the past several years Mapleton and Gibby have been embroiled in

several lawsuits over the development and use of the Gibby Property. For instance,
5

Mapleton has sued Gibby for a declaration that a certain trail which transverses the Gibby
Property is a public right of way, and in the alternative, Mapleton sued Gibby to
condemn the trail for public use. Mapleton also sought to condemn an easement for a
water main across the Gibby Property. Gibby's lawsuits against the City include, among
other things, a federal case alleging violation of his civil rights and a suit challenging the
City's denial of his requests to re-zone the Gibby Property to something other than CEl.(R. 594).
6.

On May 15, 2007, after Mapleton had adopted a resolution approving such an

agreement, Mapleton and Gibby entered into an agreement captioned "Memorandum of
Understanding to Settle Pending Litigation and all Claims Known and Unknown"
("MOU"). The MOU was intended to resolve all pending legislative efforts and the
ongoing litigation between the parties. (R. 594).
7.

The MOU outlined the framework for a proposed re-zone of the Gibby

Property. It also provided that, at no cost to the City, "the Gibby Parties agree to provide
an easement for a trail from the north and south property lines of the Gibby Parties1
property across the west escarpment of the property . . . ." The MOU also provided that
"the Gibby Parties will grant an easement, at no cost to the City, for its water main." It also
provided that the City will widen Dogwood Drive at the City's expense. (R. 594).
8.

Thereafter, the City staff made various changes to the text of the ordinance

as set forth at the July 17, 2007, City Council meeting. An updated draft of the ordinance
was brought to the City Council for ratification at the Council's regularly scheduled August
21, 2007, meeting. After much discussion, the City Council voted 3-2 to approve the
6

proposed text of the PD-2 ordinance. This action effectively amended the existing
development code to enact a new zoning designation entitled Planned Development-2
("PD-2" zone). The ordinance was designated as Mapleton Ordinance 2007-17. Although
the PD-2 zone was created, it had yet to be applied to the Gibby Property. (R. 593-92).
9.

Also during the August 21, 2007, City Council meeting, the Council

unanimously voted to amend the Land Use Element of the City's overall General Plan. (R.
592).
10.

During the "public comment" portion of the August 21, 2007, City Council

meeting, Appellants notified Gibby, the City Council, and Mapleton Mayor Jim Brady that
Appellants and others opposed to the new PD-2 ordinance planned to file an application for
referendum petition. (R. 592).
11.

On August 23, 2007, the Gibby Parties pursued an application before the

Mapleton Planning Commission to rezone the Gibby Property from CE-1 to the PD-2 Zone.
The Planning Commission voted to give an unfavorable recommendation to the City
Council regarding Gibby's request. (R. 592).
12.

Gibby's rezone application and request came before the City Council on

September 18, 2007, at a regularly scheduled meeting, and was unanimously approved
subject to numerous conditions, including, but not limited to, final plat approval of
Intervenors1 proposed subdivision. (R. 592).
13.

On September 18, 2007, Appellants requested referendum applications from

the City. Appellants subsequently circulated the referendum petitions to various residents,
and timely filed their original referendum petitions with the County Clerk (with copies to
7

the City Recorder) on October 5, 2007, forty-five (45) days after the enactment of the PD2 ordinance. (R. 592).
14.

Appellants commenced this action on or about October 15, 2007, and

obtained a Temporary Restraining Order on October 15, 2007. (R. 591).
15.

On October 18, 2007, the Utah County Clerk's office sent Mapleton City

Recorder Camille Brown written certification that 2,973 was the total number of all votes
cast in Mapleton City for all candidates for Governor at the 2004 election, that "[t]he number
of petition signatures necessary was 1,041," and that "[t]he total number of certified
signatures is 864 which does not equal the number required by [statute].5' The Utah
County Clerk's office instructed the City Recorder, "By statute, then, you must mark the
petition as 'insufficient.'" (R. 591).
16.

After consulting with legal counsel, Ms. Brown and Mapleton determined

that it would be best to refer the disputed issue to the Court. (R. 591).
17.

There was no real dispute among those involved in this litigation that the

referendum sponsors followed all of the "technical" requirements of Utah Code Ann. §
20A-l-60\,etseq.
18.

(R. 591).

Testimony from the trial verified that the referendum sponsors met the

requirements of Section 602, which requires that the referendum petition have a copy of the
challenged law attached and that it contain certain warnings to the potential signers of the
petition; that the sponsors met the requirements of Section 604 concerning circulation of
the petition; that a large number of signatures were obtained by the sponsors as required by
Section 605; that the sponsors submitted the petitions to the County Clerk for verification
8

of the status of the signers of the petition as required by Section 606; that the petition was
submitted to the County Clerk on October 5, 2007, 45 days after the adoption of the
ordinance which was enacted on August 21, 2007; and finally that the County elections
office certified 864 signatures and declared that 2,973 Mapleton voters cast ballots in the
preceding gubernatorial election. (R. 591-90).
19.

The evidence demonstrated that Plaintiffs obtained 864 certified signatures

from a total of 2,973 voters in the preceding gubernatorial election, and that Plaintiffs
gathered signatures of 29% of the registered voters. (R. 590).
20.

The parties stipulated to the adequacy of notice under Citizens Awareness Now

v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). (R. 590).
21.

The legislative intent and general purpose and policy of the original zoning

designation of the Gibby Property, namely CE-1, are set forth in Mapleton City Code §
18.30.010. (R. 590).
22.

The Mapleton City Code ("MCC") provides, in pertinent part, that Mthe CE-

1 zone includes those areas of the City which, as the result of the presence of steep
slopes, soil characteristics, flood hazards, erosion, mud flow or earthquake potential,
wildlife hazards or other similar natural conditions or environmental hazards are considered
environmentally sensitive and fragile." MCC § 18.30.010 preamble. (R. 590).
23.

The purpose of the CE-1 zone was not to ban development. (R. 590).

24.

The text states that it is an attempt to "recognize and appropriately balance:

1) the need for preservation of the natural environmental conditions; 2) the need for
mitigation of potentially adverse or unsafe conditions arising from development activities;
9

3) the protection of the interests of subsequent purchasers and occupants; and 4) the rights of
current owners to the reasonable use of their property." MCC § 18.30.010. A. Development
within "the natural limitations . . . of the environment was actually encouraged." Id. §
18.30.010.D. (R. 590-89).
25.

Torn Nielsen, former Mapleton Planning Commission Member from 1984-

1989 and member of the subcommittee that helped research and draft the original CE-1 zone,
testified that when the CE-1 zone was originally enacted, its main purpose was to protect
sensitive lands from the type of landslides Utah had recently experienced, to cover all
potentially hazardous areas of Mapleton City, and to protect against various geological
hazards that were thought to exist at that time. (R. 589).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When they adopted the Utah Constitution the citizens of the State reserved to
themselves the power of direct legislation through referendum. That power belongs to
the people. After Mapleton City adopted a new zoning classification, the PD-2 zone,
Friends, with the signatures of 29% of the voters of the City, sought to exercise their
power of referendum. They were thwarted by the City and rebuffed by the trial court
when it issued an erroneous decision holding that application of the Marakis factors
confirmed that the action of the city council was administrative in nature and thus, not
referable. This Court must zealously protect Friends' constitutional right of referendum
and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of that right.
Fourteen years after Marakis, this Court, in Mouty, held that a zone amendment
changing a prohibited use to now allow the use was a legislative act. In reaching that
10

conclusion the Court held that no Marakis analysis was needed because in Mouty, the
council action was taken in a city with a strong mayor/council form of government and
thus all actions of the city council by definition are legislative in nature. Friends asked
the trial court to follow that precedent. If a zone change in one city is legislative in
nature, a substantially similar zone change in another city, regardless of its organizational
model, also must be legislative in nature. Differences in the form of government in two
cities enacting substantially similar zone changes cannot provide a principled or reliable
basis for different treatment. The trial court erred when it failed to follow the Mouty
precedent.
This Court has repeatedly held in the context of direct appeals of zoning decisions
that the adoption of a zone change or a zone classification is a legislative act. This is
because, in adopting a new zone classification, a city council weighs competing interests
in the community, evaluates growth patterns and makes other similar policy judgments.
Only legislative bodies can make major policy decisions for a city. Thus, adoption of a
new zone classification is the making of a new law rather than the implementation of an
existing zoning law. As such it is legislative in nature. This Court should adopt that
bright-line rule.
Marakis is unworkable because it does not recognize that the adoption of a new
zoning classification is a legislative act. It also is unworkable because it does not provide
individuals, cities and courts with an objective standard upon which to base a decision
that a particular zone ordinance is referable. As an example, Marakis requires a trial
court to evaluate whether a zone change ordinance is of such a complex nature that it is
11

not appropriate for voter participation. But Marakis provides a trial court no objective
standard or measure for such analysis. In this case Friends asserted that the effect of the
zone change was readily apparent and understandable by the general public because lay
citizens could understand the significant differences between the two zones. Mr. Gibby
argued that the matter was overly complex because it took sixteen separate geotechnical
studies to determine that the property was fit for residential development.

Because

Marakis provides no guidance to trial courts on how they should evaluate whether a
matter is too complex for citizen input, it places an undue burden on the constitutional
right of referendum. As well, Mouty held that complexity is not an issue in a city with a
strong mayor/council form of government. How and why should it be an issue in other
cities with a different corporate model?
Marakis is unworkable because it treats citizens of some cities differently than
citizens of other cities. Marakis requires a fact-intensive analysis, which always is costly.
But that significant expense only falls on some of the citizens of the State. Others have
access to their constitutional right of referendum without that expense. While there may
be cases where a legislative/administrative distinction must be made, because adoption of
a new zone classification is the making of a new law, that distinction did not need to be
made in this case and the trial court erred when it did so.
Finally, the trial court erred in its evaluation of whether the general purpose and
policy of the new PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing
CE-1 zone. While the trial court should have looked at the substantial body of evidence
that Friends provided including the City Vision Statement, its General Plan and Map, the
12

text of the CE-1 zone and the text of the PD-2 zone, all the trial court did was contrast the
preambles of the two zones, the CE-1 and the PD-2. The many documents described
above identified a policy for the CE-1 zone of limited development on the hillsides, large
lot sizes and frontages and significant slope protections. The new zone retained none of
these. The General Plan provided that PD zones should be located in areas far from the
Critical Environmental land use area but the new zone is a PD zone in that area. Had it
properly considered all of this evidence the trial court would have upheld the right of
referendum in this case. It erred when it failed to do so. Because of that error this Court
must reverse.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHAT IS NOT AT ISSUE.

Several matters are not at issue.

The trial court concluded that Friends

scrupulously followed all of the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann, § 20A-7-601,
et seq. in seeking the referendum. The trial court also concluded that the new zoning
ordinance is not a land use law for purposes of the higher petition signature requirement.
No one contests either of these conclusions of the trial court. Further, though the parties
spent considerable time putting on evidence on material variance and appropriateness for
voter participation, the trial court did not reach these issues. Because these issues were
not decided by the trial court they are not the subject of this appeal.
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II.

THE REFERENDUM RIGHT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
WHICH THIS COURT MUST JEALOUSLY PROTECT.

The Utah Constitution provides that "[t]he legal voters of any county, city, or
town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided
by statute, may (ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the
county, city, or town, to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before
the law or ordinance may take effect." UTAH CONST, art. VI § l(2)(b)(ii). This right of
the people to directly legislate is a right which our Supreme Court has held must be
jealously guarded from encroachment.
[T]he Utah Constitution vests the people's sovereign legislative power in
both (1) a representative legislature and (2) the people of the State, in
whom all political power is inherent. . . . Pursuant to article VI, section 1
of the Utah Constitution, the people exercise their direct legislative power
through initiatives and referenda. . . . Article VI, section 1 is not merely a
grant of the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees the
initiative power to the people. . . . The power of the legislature and the
power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are
coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share "equal dignity" . . . .
Because the people's right to directly legislate through initiative and
referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it
against encroachment and maintain it inviolate.
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89ffi[23, 27, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002).
Although the legislature has a role in creating the enabling legislation which
defines and gives body and substance to the right of initiative and referendum:
In carrying out this duty, the legislature may not "pass laws that unduly
burden or diminish the people's right to initiate legislation." . . . Due to
"the fundamental nature of the right of initiative . . . , the vitality of
ensuring that the right is not effectively abrogated, severely limited, or
unduly burdened by the procedures enacted to enable the right and to place
initiatives on the ballot is of paramount importance."
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Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32 \ 29, 94
P.3d 217 (Utah 2004) (quoting Gallivan v. Walker, supra).
Within the last few months this Court again has expressed the fundamental nature
of the initiative right (and its corollary right, referendum).
The authority of the legislature to set conditions on the exercise of the
initiative power by the people must be read in coordination with the other
rights of the people expressed and reserved in the constitution. It is limited,
as a consequence, to the role of providing for the orderly and reasonable
use of the initiative power. It does not follow, logically or constitutionally,
that the authority to set limits on conditions, manner, or time gives the
legislature the broader authority to deny the initiative right to the people.
Sevier Power Company, LLC v. Board of Sevier County Commissioners, 2008 UT
72 (October 17, 2008) \ 10 (emphasis in original).
In this case all that Friends has sought is to exercise their right to direct legislation.
The City wishes to adopt a new zoning classification. Friends asserts that the adoption of
a new zone classification is the making of a new law, and therefore, legislative in
character and subject to referendum. Yet, in order to vindicate this right Friends have
expended tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and have spent six days in a
bench trial and now are prosecuting this appeal.

All for a constitutional right, an

important and fundamental constitutional right. "The referendum right [is] fundamental
to our conception of government, [and it] should not and cannot be . . . easily thwarted."
Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 4 f 5, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah 2005). In its
consideration of this case Friends asks that this Court remember the words of the
California Supreme Court, quoted with approval in Gallivan: "[I]t is our solemn duty to
jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in
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favor of its exercise." See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d
1309, 1313 (1991) (en banc).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW
THE PRECEDENT OF MOUTY.

In Mouty, this Court upheld, as a legislative act of a city council, the amendment
to a zoning classification in Sandy City. At trial Friends asked that the lower court
follow that precedent as the facts of this case are strikingly similar to the facts in Mouty.
However the trial court erred when it refused to follow Mouty. This court must correct
that error and conclude that Mouty provides clear precedent that the action of the
Mapleton City Council in adopting the PD-2 zone was a legislative act, and thus subject
to referendum.
In Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994), the Court
adopted a four-part analysis to determine whether an action by a city council is an
administrative or a legislative act. Almost the entirety of the 6-day trial in this case was
spent introducing evidence on three of those four Marakis factors.1

As discussed

hereafter, the trial court erred in its Marakis analysis. However, as an independent basis
for reversal, the 2005 case of Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder provides contours which give
guidance in this case and which demonstrate the trial court's clear, reversible error when
it rejected Friends' request to apply the precedent of Mouty to this case.
In Mouty this Court found that a city ordinance as to which a referendum was
sought in fact was legislative in nature, the only post-Marakis, zoning related case that
1

Appellants do not and never did dispute that they had adequate notice of the city
council actions rendering the first leg of the Marakis test a non-issue.
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has done so.2 Because the ordinance at issue in Mouty was found to be legislative in
nature and thus referable, and because the ordinance in this case is significantly similar to
that found to be referable in Mouty, the ordinance here also must be legislative in
character and referable. This is so for several reasons:
Mouty, as the Court knows, concluded that in a city which uses, as its form of
government, the strong mayor/council form described in and authorized by the Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act,3 held that actions of the city council by definition
are legislative in nature. Yet it simply cannot be the case that one city can adopt a zone
amendment and the zone amendment will be legislative in nature because the city
operates in a strong mayor/council form of government, while a smaller city with a sixmember council adopts a virtually identical zone amendment, as was the case here, and
the trial court properly concludes that the zone amendment was an administrative act.
Such an outcome is neither legally tenable nor intellectually honest. Either an action is
fundamentally legislative in nature or it is an administrative action. But the same action,
taken in two different cities, does not have a different character by reason of the form of
government of the council taking the action.

To rule otherwise exalts form over

substance.

2

After Marakis was decided in 1994, only two cases have found an ordinance as to
which a referendum was sought to be legislative in nature: Mouty and Low v. Monticello,
54 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2002). Low was not a zoning related case.
3

The 2008 legislature repealed the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act and in
lieu thereof adopted the Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3b101, et seq.
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Second, as the Court said in Citizens for Responsible Transportation v. Draper
City, 2008 UT 43 t 11, 190 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2008), "The determinative test in deciding
whether an action is legislative or administrative in nature is whether it creates new law
on the one hand, or merely executes or implements existing law on the other." Mouty
makes clear that the adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance to change permitted
uses for a zone classification that is site-specific is the creation of a new law—a
legislative act. Thus, by the standard of Citizens for Responsible Transportation, in
Mouty the zone change, as a matter of law, must have been the creation of a new law.
As demonstrated below, the zone change in this case is virtually identical to the
type of zone change involved in Mouty. If treating like matters in a like fashion, which is
what the common law development of the law is all about, means anything, then the zone
change in this case, as was the zone change in Mouty, also must be the creation of a new
law—a legislative act.
In Mouty the Court held that the proposed amendment to the zone category there, a
change which would remove the restriction on big box stores in a site-specific zone, was
the adoption of a new law, and thus referable. In the present case the zone change
proposed by Mapleton City, as to which appellants sought a referendum, was the creation
of a new zone classification or category to allow previously prohibited uses on a specific
parcel of property and to remove restrictions on development in a site-specific zone. If
amending a zone category to change a prohibited use to a permitted use is the making of
a new law, then it follows that the creation of a new zone category to change prohibited
uses and remove restrictions on development on a specific site also must be the creation
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of a new law. In this case the trial court erred because it did not recognize that the
creation of a new zone classification that changed prohibited uses to permitted uses was
legislative in nature, even without reference to the four-part test of Marakis.
As is demonstrated in the following chart, the zone changes in Mouty and in the
Mapleton case are virtually identical.
Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder

Mapleton Case

Zone before zone change: SD-X
Length of time zone has existed: 16 years
Parcel size:
100 acres
City size:
14,635 acres
Parcel size/City size:
0.6%
Prohibited use:
Big box store

Zone before zone change: CE-1
Length of time zone has existed: 23 years
Parcel size:
118 acres
City size:
7680 acres
Parcel size/City size:
1.5%
Prohibited uses:
No building in steep slopes and no
significant development on hillsides.

Proposed zone change:
Amend zone category to change
prohibited to permitted use and allow big
box store

Proposed zone change:
Create new zone category to change
from prohibition of hillside development
to allow hillside development and to allow
significant development in previously
protected area

It does not take any imagination to see that the proposed zone changes in Mouty
and in this case are nearly identical. Each involves a long-existing zone that consisted of
a very large parcel, each proposed a change to the zone classification to change what had
been a prohibited uses to now allow such uses. Given the controlling precedent of Mouty
and notwithstanding Marakis, this Court must reverse the trial court and hold the zone
change legislative in nature, and thus referable to the voters of Mapleton.
Given this analysis, the question may be asked: but what of Marakis? There are at
least three salient responses:
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First, as stated above, it simply cannot be the law that the form of government
employed by a city determines whether an action by that city council is legislative or
administrative. Yet that is exactly the outcome from the trial court's Marakis analysis.
Something besides form of government must control the question of whether council
action is legislative in nature. Here the only real distinction between what occurred in
Mouty and what occurred in this case is the nature of the form of government of the two
cities.

That cannot provide a principled basis for the disparate treatment between

virtually identical fact patterns in Sandy City and in Mapleton.
Secondly, and importantly, while application of the clear precedent of Mouty will
obviate the need for a Marakis analysis in this case, the result should be the same. If a
city council makes the policy decision to change the existing zoning law of the city by
establishing an entirely new zone classification, that change must, by definition, be a shift
in the then existing general purpose and policy of the existing zoning ordinance and also,
a material variance to the existing zoning law. What existed before has been changed in
major and important ways: in Sandy City a prohibited use on a matter of significant
concern was changed to a permitted use in the zone. In Mapleton prohibited uses,
densities, slope regulation and the like, again matters of significant concern, were
addressed and allowed in the newly created zone. The clear and logical application and
extension of Mouty is that the adoption of a new zoning classification by a city council,
any city council, simply must be a legislative act, and therefore satisfies the framework
upon which Marakis is built. That was what occurred in Mouty. It is what the trial court
should have done in this case. In failing to do so the trial court clearly was wrong. This
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Court should remedy that error by holding that the adoption of a new zone classification
is the adoption of a new law, and thus referable. This can be accomplished without the
need for a Marakis analysis.
Third, as set forth in Section IV below, Marakis cries out for some modification.
It simply does not work the way the Court intended it to work.
IV.

MARAKIS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED OR AMENDED BECAUSE
ADOPTION OF A NEW ZONE CLASSIFICATION IS A
LEGISLATIVE ACT.

Faced with the cases of Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964) and Wilson v.
Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982), each of which concluded that changing a residential
zone to a commercial zone was an administrative and not a legislative act of the city, in
Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, this Court adopted a formula of analysis that simply
does not work. We urge the Court either to amend or distinguish Marakis,4
a.

The Adoption of the New Zone Classification is the Making of a
New Law That is a Proper Subject of a Citizen Referendum.

This Court has faced the question of whether adoption of a zoning ordinance is an
administrative or legislative act in two different circumstances: 1) deciding whether a
zoning ordinance is referable, and 2) resolving a direct judicial challenge to the adoption
of a zoning ordinance. The result has been curious. In essentially every case in which
the Court has looked at the administrative/legislative distinction in the context of a
challenge to a zoning ordinance by a direct attack, the Court (and the Court of Appeals)

4

Frankly, in our view, the Court should distinguish Marakis or modify its analytical
framework and overrule both Bird and Wilson. Neither of these earlier cases can stand a
rigorous examination, particularly given the analysis and result in Monty.
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has held that the adoption of a zoning classification or the rezoning of a parcel of
property is a legislative act. Cases which represent this view include:
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16^11, 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003):
There is no dispute in this case that the enactment and amendment of
zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act. Sandy City v. Salt
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) (M[t]he passage of general
zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly
vested in the legislative branch") (quoting Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988)). The political nature of the decision
making process underlying municipal zoning demands that the power to
make such decisions be vested in persons who are publicly accountable for
their choices. See Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (noting that accountability for
balancing competing interests in zoning decisions properly resides in the
"governing body of the city"). (Emphasis added).
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT 31118, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah App. 2000):
We also reach this conclusion because the distinction between a
municipality's legislative and administrative functions rests on an important
principle: It is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy, a
judicial body's job to interpret the policy, and an administrative body's job
to enforce the policy. Establishing zoning classifications reflects a
legislative policy decision with which courts will not interfere except in the
most extreme cases. (Emphasis added).
Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 n.6 (Utah App. 1998):
A city council acts within its legislative function when passing a zoning or
rezoning ordinance. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 220
(Utah 1992); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co.,
545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976); Nay lor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah
2d 300, 301-03, 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); Salt Lake City v.
Western Foundry & Stove Repair Works, 55 Utah 447, 452, 455, 187 P.
829, 830-31, 832 (Utah 1920); see also 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr.,
Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning & Planning 27A.04[3], at 27A- 35 n. 39
(1997) (Emphasis added).
In an apparent effort to explain the Bird and Wilson competing line of cases, the
Court of Appeals in Smith Investment then said:
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In Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964), the Supreme
Court of Utah termed rezonings 'administrative* for purposes of holding
them to be unfit subjects for referendum. For all other purposes, however,
rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative.
In short, this Court has consistently held, in all cases which look at whether an
ordinance is administrative or legislative for all purposes other than whether an ordinance
is referable, that adoption of zoning classifications is a legislative act.
Then came Mouty.

In concluding that a zone change ordinance is referable

because it was adopted by a city council in a city with a strong mayor/council form of
government, the Court for the first time faced the essential fact: adoption of a zone
change ordinance is legislative. Why? Because it was adopted by a legislative city
council. Yet, it is difficult to discover a principled basis between what occurred in Mouty
and what occurred in both Bird and Wilson. In each of these cases there was an
amendment to the zone classification. In Mouty the change was to allow big box stores in
a zone where such stores previously had been prohibited. In both Bird and Wilson the
change was to rezone property from residential to commercial. Yet there simply is not a
logically explainable basis for the completely different conclusions.

And, as noted

above, the form of government of the council involved cannot provide such a rationale.
Mouty can be explained and harmonized with the just-quoted line of cases. It cannot be
harmonized with either Bird or Wilson. That it cannot be harmonized with Bird or
Wilson is telling.
In the language of Citizens for Responsible Transportation, "The determinative
test in deciding whether an action is legislative or administrative in nature is whether it
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creates new law on the one hand, or merely executes or implements existing law on the
other." 2008 UT 43 ^ 11.

Making the policy decision to create a new zoning

classification is the making of a new law, not the implementation of an existing law,
because what is occurring is the adoption of a significant change to the zoning ordinance.
Such changes by their very nature involve consideration and balancing of competing
interests in the community, evaluation of growth patterns and where growth should be
allowed to occur, analysis of why certain areas are better suited to specific uses than
others, and a host of similar issues. At the heart of this evaluation is the exercise of
judgment: Should the city create a new zone classification? In making that decision the
city council is exercising a legislative judgment because these are important policy
considerations. To use this Court's language from Bradley: "There is no dispute in this
case that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a
legislative act." 2003 UT 16 \ 11. Not "sort o f or "partially" a legislative act, but
"fundamentally a legislative act." Applied to this case, the adoption of a new zone
classification is "fundamentally a legislative act." As such it surely must be referable.
The language of the Court of Appeals in Harmon City, Inc. resonates:
"Establishing zoning classifications reflects a legislative policy decision . . . ." 2000 UT
31 ^f 18 (Emphasis added). It resonates because this position is consistent with the long
list of cases referred to above which have made exactly that point. It resonates because it
recognizes the essential character of what a city council is doing when it adopts or
amends a zone classification. It resonates because, at its core, it is accurate.

And it

resonates because, as this Court observed in Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P2d 1362, 1359
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(Utah 1977): "The city performed a legislative function when they weighed the public
benefit of the ordinance." (Emphasis added).
Because the creation of a new zone classification is a legislative act, when the
Mapleton City Council adopted the PD-2 zone ordinance it was making a new law, a law
which properly was referable to the citizens of Mapleton. Further, such a policy provides
the kind of bright-line rule approved by this Court in Mouty.5
b.

Marakis is Unworkable; the Marakis Analysis Must be Modified.

In Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, the Court, in an important effort to provide
a standard by which trial courts can judge whether action taken by a city council is
administrative or legislative, adopted a four-part, sequential test. Yet that standard is
unworkable and must be amended.
i.

Marakis is Unworkable Because it Does Not Recognize
That Adoption of a Zoning Classification is a Legislative
Act

As set forth above, only a legislative body, acting in a legislative capacity, is
empowered to make broad policy decisions for a municipality, decisions which include
the creation of new zone classifications and which parcels in the city should be placed in
specific zoning categories. Marakis, however, ignores this principle. Rather, in every

5

"The above considerations, coupled with the unquestionable reality that a bright-line
rule establishing which municipal acts are referable, would serve the interests of both the
electorate and municipal governments, lead us to conclude that all acts taken by a city
council in a city organized pursuant to the council-mayor form of government are
necessarily legislative and subject to referenda." Mouty If 36.
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zoning case as to which a referendum is sought,6 the Marakis test applies and requires
extensive litigation. Marakis is unworkable and should be amended because even in
those cases where it is clear that a new law is being adopted, parties are put to the
expense of a Marakis analysis, an analysis which can reach the wrong result, as happened
in this case.
Mouty and Low v. Monticello, 54 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2002), each demonstrate that
cases and circumstances exist which render a Marakis analysis unnecessary. In Mouty a
Marakis analysis was unnecessary because by definition the action of the Sandy City
Council was legislative in nature. In Low, the Court concluded, based on prior precedent
that "the decision to purchase or acquire a power system . . . is a purely legislative
decision . . . . 54 P.3d at 1161. In this case this Court properly should conclude that a
Marakis analysis is unnecessary if a new zoning classification is being created as a
significant policy decision is being made by the city council. In making policy decisions
the council is making a new law, not implementing an existing law. Adopting this rule
would obviate a Marakis analysis in those circumstances when it really is clear that new
law is being made. Marakis should be amended to provide this bright-line rule.
ii.

Marakis Allows
Judgments.

Impermissibly

Broad,

Subjective

A second criticism of Marakis is that the analysis which it directs results in
subjective evaluations by trial courts.

Such evaluations lack the certainty and

fundamental fairness which the protection of a fundamental constitutional right deserves.
6

At least every zoning case in which a referendum is sought that is not in a city with the
strong mayor/council form of government at issue in Mouty.
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For purposes of example we will refer to the fourth Marakis factor, "whether the zoning
change implicates a policy-making decision amenable to voter control." Marakis at 1125.
(We believe other Marakis analysis points, particularly the general purpose and policy
analysis, also result in too subjective of a review.)
This test, as Marakis notes, requires the trial court to determine whether the
proposed change is "of such complexity that it is not practical for the public to give it
sufficient time and attention to make a proper determination of the matter." Id. But how
is a trial court to determine whether a matter is so complex that it is not practical for voter
participation?
This case demonstrates the problem. Mr. Gibby argued that the issue was too
complex for voter participation because he had commissioned sixteen separate
geotechnical studies about his property in the CE-1 zone. If a matter is so complex that
sixteen different geotechnical studies were required, the matter must be too complex for
the general voting public. Friends countered with evidence that the Mayor and the
members of the city council never read any of these studies. (Tr. 734-35). Rather, the
Mayor explained, they relied upon statements to them of the meaning of these studies
provided by the City engineer. (Tr. 734-35). Additionally, Friends argued that the issue
of the zone change had much less to do with what the sixteen studies describe about the
Gibby property and much more to do with whether voters were comfortable with
significant development in the Critical Environment land use area, whether they agreed
with a change from essentially no development on the bench area to significant
development there and whether a relaxing of the hillside protections was appropriate.
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None of these issues are complex at all. They are precisely the kinds of policy
judgments that legislative bodies make when making zoning decisions. Friends argued
that there is a certain arrogancy in claiming that these kinds of questions are too complex
for voter participation. But more than that, there is no objective standard by which a trial
judge can judge whether a matter is too complex for voter participation. Finding of Fact
# 3 6 demonstrates that this trial judge thought the matter was too complex for voter
participation. It also demonstrates that Marakis provides no objective standard upon
which to base such a conclusion. Rather, when considering this issue the trial judge has
the essentially unfettered discretion either to jump on the bandwagon of the municipality
or the land developer and talk about sixteen studies, or it can look at the heart of the issue
being decided, as Friends asserted it should have done, and conclude that the matter in
fact is understandable and one as to which a lay person should be allowed to express a
policy preference.
Because Marakis restricts the implementation of a fundamental constitutional right
without any objective standard by which a trial judge can measure the appropriateness of
voter participation, the Marakis analysis constitutes an impermissible encroachment on
this constitutional right. In our view, consideration of the general purpose and policy test
also is fraught with potential for a subjective analysis. This significantly subjective
standard is unfair, both to trial judges, and more importantly, to the parties to a
referendum dispute.

7

The second issue that the trial court must consider to measure complexity is whether
the zoning changes involves "the practical exigencies of the operation of city
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Finally, is complexity even an issue? Not in cities with the strong mayor/council
form of government for in those cities, even if the matter has great complexity, the
citizens are entitled to a referendum.

This Court concluded in Mouty that it was

"confident that the ability to exercise the referendum power over the full range of zoning
matters acted upon by a city council organized under the council-mayor form of
government will not wreak havoc upon the smooth operation of municipalities." Mouty
at f 36. Nor should it wreak havoc in cities operating under any other form of municipal
government. Mouty also made clear that there are other, restraining checks on the
referendum power, including signature requirements and procedural requirements.
{Mouty TJ 35). From experience Friends notes that the very short time periods for action
also provides a serious, limiting check on the power. In short, having referenda from
time to time does not weaken a city nor seriously impair the ability of a city council to
govern.

government." Marakis ^ 13. Said another way, will communities "be subject to the
undesirable phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient and often
arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal land development." Id. Evidence on
this issue also was introduced at trial. Mayor Brady testified that in the nineteen years he
had served the City either as City Attorney, City Council Person or Mayor, the City never
before had held a referendum. Friends also introduced evidence that the Vision
Statement of the City (Ex. 14, Add. 49) explains that an important part of the vision of
the residents of the City is that they "are citizens who participate in deciding matters that
affect us . . . ." and that they encourage "[a] general vote on issues with city-wide
impact." Notwithstanding this evidence, in Finding of Fact No. 36 the trial court quoted
the same Marakis language about the dangers of piecemeal land development.
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iii.

Marakis is Unworkable Because it Treats Citizens of Some
Cities Differently Than Citizens of Other Cities.

In the trial court Friends argued that Marakis is unfair because it is discriminatory.
The Marakis analysis requires a significantly different effort to obtain a referendum from
the citizens of some classes of cities and counties than from the citizens of other cities.
Mouty and this case demonstrate the point. When asked to recognize this difference and
the fact that Marakis places significantly unequal burdens on referendum sponsors, the
trial court simply ignored the matter. That was error which this court should remedy.
As the Court acknowledged in Mouty, the Marakis test is an "admittedly factintensive analysis." Mouty \ 24.

Another word which, in the context of contested

litigation, always can be substituted for "fact-intensive" is "expensive". Unlike the rain,
which falls on the just and the unjust, the expense of a Marakis analysis only falls on
residents of smaller towns and counties, but never on people from the larger cities which
operate with the strong mayor/council form of government. For them there never will be
the significant Marakis expense if a city council adopts a zoning ordinance because under
Mouty no such analysis is required.8 What's more, the playbook for smaller cities and

In the field of quantum mechanics there long has been a discussion of Schrodinger's cat
in a sealed box but no one knows if the cat is dead or alive. We know that the
hypothetical cat is either alive or dead. But quantum mechanics theory is that, until the
box is opened and the cat is observed, it is both alive and dead. Quantum mechanics
aside, we know the cat is one or the other; it cannot be both at the same time. Similarly,
in this case, the same action taken by two different city councils, cannot be legislative in
one city and administrative in the other. In fairness, the same facts must consistently
result in one finding or the other. Otherwise, access to constitutional entitlements is
random, though we don't live in a random judicial universe. As well, it is unfair for a
resident of some cities to have to open the box to find out whether the matter is
legislative or administrative, at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees,
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counties which face referendum petitions is to immediately force the matter to court
under Marakis because the companion of a threat of litigation is the reality of tens of
thousands of dollars in attorney's fees. While cities feign confidence in courts and say:
"Let's go there;" what they really are saying is: "Do you know how much this will cost?"
Cities should be invited, through a clear message from this Court to accept that citizens
can make or overrule laws when enough voters have a concern that they satisfy the
signature requirements for placing a matter on the ballot.
While, at first blush it may seem logical and appropriate to let courts decide
whether a matter properly is referable, the simple threat of doing so creates the specter of
significant attorney's fees. In this case it took six trial days and countless other hours of
preparation to put on a Marakis analysis trial, all so the residents of Mapleton could
vindicate their fundamental constitutional right of direct democracy. On the other hand,
residents in Salt Lake City, Sandy, Provo, Ogden, West Valley City, and other large cities
which operate with the strong mayor/council form of government never have a Marakis
fight when they seek a referendum.

This is because of Mouty.

The result is a

substantially different burden on the constitutional right of direct democracy in a small
town than in a larger city; a burden that is unfair and discriminatory.
What is the remedy? For this case the matter is clear. Every time a city adopts a
new zone classification it is making new policy and hence new law. The Court should
hold that no Marakis analysis is needed when a new zone classification is created or a
while residents of other cities neither have to open the box nor incur the significant
attorney's fees.
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zone classification is amended. And, as noted in Mouty, it can do so without worry that
the referendum will "wreak havoc upon the smooth operation of municipalities." (Mouty
H35).9

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NEW
ORDINANCE FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL PURPOSE AND
POLICY OF THE ORIGINAL ZONING ORDINANCE.

Although Friends strongly asserts that the Court need not reach Marakis for the
reasons set forth above, we move to a direct explanation of the error of the trial court
when it concluded that Ordinance 2007-17, which adopted the PD-2 zone classification
for application to the Gibby property, falls within the general purpose and policy of the
original zoning ordinance.
a.

The Trial Court's Factual Findings Were Inadequate and
Conclusory.

While Friends are mindful of their duty to marshal the evidence pertaining to the
trial court's factual findings which are clearly erroneous, and they have done so herein,
Utah law is clear that "[a]n appellant... is not required to marshal the evidence when the
trial court's 'findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as
factual determinations.'" (Justice Michael J. Wilkins, A "Primer" in Utah State Appellate
Practice, 2000 UTAH L. REV. I l l , 128 (citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477
9

A second problem with the cost of the Marakis analysis is that, at a trial, referendum
sponsors must put on evidence on all of the four Marakis factors. Our law provides no
vehicle for piecemeal litigation. Thus, Friends spent six days in trial introducing
evidence on each of the Marakis criteria. Yet, because of the Marakis sequential analysis
the trial court v/as not required to reach the last two factors: material variance and
appropriateness for voter participation. But if this case is remanded to the trial court to
address those issues then these referendum sponsors may face the prospect of subsequent,
piecemeal appellate review.
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(Utah App. 1991))). In this case, the trial court's factual findings are inadequate and
significantly impair Friends' ability to meaningfully challenge the findings.
In order for the trial court to determine whether the PD-2 zone falls "within the
general purpose and policy of the original ordinance [the CE-1 zone]," Marakis at 1124, the
trial court "[in] applying this element . . . must first determine the general purpose and
policy of the original ... zoning category" and then "consider whether the cumulative
result of the zoning change at issue . . . falls within the general purpose and policy of
the original [ordinance] designation." Id. As described above, Mouty called this an
"admittedly fact-intensive analysis," Mouty ^ 24, in which the trial must consider "a
variety of factors, including the plain language of the ordinance, council meeting
minutes, the intent of the enacting authority . . . and any other reliable and relevant
evidence." Marakis at 1124 (emphasis added).
In this case, however, the trial court did not look at any of this kind of evidence.
Its factual findings are largely conclusory, with no meat on the bones.

While, as

demonstrated hereafter, extensive evidence was presented regarding the plain language of
both the CE-1 and the PD-2 zones and other documents and information which establish
and explain the general purpose and policy of the CE-1 zone, there is essentially no
mention in the factual findings of any of this beyond what appears in the preambles of the
two ordinances. (R. 589-90, Add. 51). A great deal of additional evidence relating to the
intent of the enacting authority was introduced in the form of the Vision Statement, the
Land Use Element, the General Plan Map, and other documents and testimony. Yet none
of this evidence is even mentioned by the trial court in its findings of fact. Simply put,
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the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate. Friends should not be required to marshal
the evidence to demonstrate how these conclusory and unhelpful factual findings are
clearly erroneous..
b.

Certain of the Trial Court's Factual Facts are Clearly
Erroneous.

Under Marakis, the first factor which the trial court considered in determining
whether the city council's adoption of an ordinance is a legislative or an administrative
act is "whether the newly enacted zoning change falls within the general purpose and
policy of the original zoning ordinance." See id. at 1124. The trial court concluded that
the PD-2 ordinance was within the general purpose and policy of the original zoning
ordinance and thus concluded that the council action was administrative in nature and the
ordinance was not referable.

In reaching this determination the trial court made 36

factual findings. (Add. 1-15). Friends do not take issue with most. But as to several
factual findings, we do take issue. The trial court clearly erred in making those findings.
Friends sets forth herein each of the findings of fact which is clearly erroneous and
citations to the record and facts which support the particular finding. In section V(c)
below, Friends will explain the evidence which demonstrates that the trial court's finding
are clearly erroneous.
Finding of Fact No. 8.

Pursuant to the MOU, at its duly-noticed and regularly-

scheduled City Council meeting on the night of July 17, 2007, Mapleton brought forth
proposed text for a zoning ordinance that would apply to the Gibby Property.

The

proposed new zone, designated as "PD-2," would allow Gibby to develop 47 lots on the
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relatively flat, buildable portions of the Gibby Property, while retaining CE-1 type
protections for environmentally sensitive areas of the Gibby Property, especially areas
having slopes exceeding 30%. The PD-2 zone allowed for clustering of homes. Gibby
also submitted for City approval, roughly contemporaneously, a preliminary plat of his
proposed 47-lot subdivision. (R. 593, Add. 5).
Friends only takes issue with the italicized portion of this factual finding that the
PD-2 zone "retain[ed] CE-1 type protections for environmentally sensitive areas of the
Gibby Property, especially areas having slopes exceeding 30%."
Finding of Fact No. 22.

The evidence showed that Ordinance 2007-17 created a

new zoning classification with a site specific focus to accommodate a specific
development and did not constitute a comprehensive change to the zoning statute. (R.
590, Add. 8).
Friends only takes issue with the italicized portion of this factual finding that the
PD-2 zone "did not constitute a comprehensive change to the zoning statute."
Finding of Fact No. 30.

The purpose and objectives of the CE-1 zone and the

PD-2 zone are similar. (R. 589, Add. 9).
Friends only takes issue with the conclusion (not really a factual finding based on
any identified evidence) that the purposes and objectives of the two zones are similar. In
broad senses they are similar. However, with only a statement that the two ordinances
are similar, but no statement of how they are similar, this finding is a completely
unhelpful conclusion, not a factual finding.
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Finding of Fact No. 31.

The enactment of the PD-2 zone maintains many of the

provisions of the CE-1 zone. (R. 589, Add. 9).
Friends acknowledges that the PD-2 zone maintains some of the provisions of the
CE-1 zone. They both apply to the same area, provide for residential development in the
area, and contain certain provisions dealing with environmental protection. (Ex. 15, Add.
51). But like Finding of Fact No. 30, this is a conclusion not based on any identified
evidence.
Finding of Fact No. 32.

These similarities include provisions on clustering, a

"buildable area" concept, and verbatim slope protection requirements.

Further,

Mapleton City maintains the ability to grant or deny permits in the PD-2 zone and the
ability to scrutinize the development the same as if it were under the CE-1 zone. (R. 589,
Add. 9).
Friends acknowledges that this finding puts a tiny bit of skin on the bare bones of
Findings No. 30 and 31. Friends takes issue with the italicized portion of this finding that
the PD-2 zone contains "verbatim slope protection requirements."
The aforementioned findings of fact are supported by the testimony of Mayor
James Brady, the then Mapleton City Mayor; by the testimony of Cory Branch, Planning
Director for Mapleton City; and by certain of the exhibits. Specifically Mayor Brady
testified that the City intended to draft a specific ordinance that would be applicable to
the Gibby Property. (Tr. 594-99, 616-17). He also testified at length regarding the
similarities in the PD-2 zone and the CE-1 zone. (Tr. 758-64). Mr. Branch testified that
he felt that the PD-2 zone was consistent with the text of the CE-1 zone. (Tr. 344). He
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testified that the enactment of the PD-2 was consistent with the CE-1 in that its intent was
to avoid development on environmentally sensitive lands in Mapleton by prohibiting
development in lands with a slope of more than 30 percent. (Tr. 345). He testified that
the PD-2 zone required a permit for any grading, plowing, excavating, cutting, or filling.
(Tr. 347-48). He testified that the City was required to make a preliminary determination
regarding erosion, flooding, or landslide concerns prior to granting a permit for such
activities. (Tr. 348^9). He testified that the PD-2 zone was essentially a mixture of the
City's RA-1 zone and the City's CE-1 zone. (Tr. 350). He testified that he understood
that the language of the CE-1 zone relating to slope protection was repeated verbatim in
the PD-2 zone. (Tr. 353). And he testified that the creation of the PD-2 zone was not
meant to be a relaxation of development standards. (Tr. 368-69). Additionally, a great
deal of documentary evidence was introduced and referred to in the form of Exhibits 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 104, 105, 110, 111 and 112. Mapleton City introduced and referred to these
exhibits at length to establish the similarities between the original CE-1 zone and the PD2 zone.
Finding of Fact No. 29.

It has been established that through numerous

individualized studies done on the Gibby property, many of these concerns have been
alleviated and that much of the Gibby property is not subject to the same type of
geological and geotechnical hazards contemplated by the CE-1 zone. (R. 589, Add. 9).
Finding of Fact No. 33.

Mapleton City Council Meeting minutes indicate that the

consideration of potential geotechnical hazards was considered in enacting the PD-2 zone.
(R. 588, Add. 10).
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Finding of Fact No. 34. The Gibby Property is not subject to the same type of
geological and geotechnical hazards as contemplated by the CE-1 zone. Studies taken
resolved Mapleton City's CE-1 based concerns. (R. 588, Add. 10).
Finding Fact No. 36. It also should be noted, this Court relies on Mouty in that it
is "hesitant to hold that an unqualified referendum right extends to municipal
considerations involving necessarily complex issues, as the resolution of such matters
may be best left to the mechanisms generally employed by municipal governments."
Mouty 1| 32. "If cities are to function efficiently, citizens must recognize that there are
certain governmental areas in which the need for continual change necessitates an
expeditious means of decision making. Otherwise, communities will be subject to the
undesirable phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient and often
arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal land development." Marakis at 1125.
Findings of Fact Nos. 29, 33, 34, and 36 all are findings that address the sixteen
studies which Mr. Gibby introduced in order to demonstrate the complexity of the matter
so that he could establish that this matter was not appropriate for voter participation, the
last of the Marakis factors. However, because the court resolved the matter at the general
purpose and policy leg of the Marakis analysis, and because Marakis is a sequential
analysis, the court did not need to reach the issue of appropriateness for voter
participation. Thus each of these four factual findings is irrelevant.
Notwithstanding, these four findings of fact are supported by the testimony of
Robert Gunnell who testified that the studies demonstrated that there were some
secondary faults, but that there was nothing that couldn't be appropriately handled with
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the offset requirements that the State of Utah requires. (Tr. 708). Additionally, William
Turner testified about the many studies that Earthtec Engineering conducted on the Gibby
Property, including where the fault traces run. (Tr. 789-812, Exhs. 206-21).
However, Mayor Brady also testified that neither he nor the Mapleton City
Council reviewed or read the reports prepared regarding the Gibby Property, but rather,
were presented with oral or written summaries of the reports from the City Engineer,
Robert Gunnell. (Tr. 734-35).
The conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that there are several factual findings
which are completely irrelevant, several that are so conclusory as to be completely
unhelpful and not really susceptible to providing a basis for the trial court's conclusions
of law, and only a very few with which Friends actually disagrees. As to those few we
have marshaled the evidence. We now turn to a demonstration that the trial court clearly
erred in its factual analysis.
c.

The Facts Introduced at Trial Clearly Demonstrate That the
General Purpose and Policy of the New Zone Does Not Fit
Within the General Purpose and Policy of the Existing Zone.

Marakis asks the question, first, "whether the newly enacted zoning change falls
within the general purpose and policy of the original zoning ordinance." Marakis at 1124.
This analysis requires a comparison and contrast of the purpose and policy of the existing
zone, in this case the CE-1 zone, with the new zone, the PD-2. More than that, however,
this also requires a comparison and contrast of the purpose and policy of the existing PD
zone and the new PD-2 zone. Because the PD-2 zone was replacing the CE-1 zone, those
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two zones must be contrasted. And because the PD-2 zone was implemented within the
existing framework of the PD zone, those two zones also must be contrasted.
As is seen from a review of his limited factual findings, the trial judge based his
conclusion that the new zone falls within the general purpose and policy of the CE-1 zone
almost exclusively by reference to the preambles of the zone text of the CE-1 and PD-2
zones. (Ex. 15, Add. 1-15). This evaluation was far too narrow in scope.
While the court must consider what the CE-1 zone text says about the policy and
purpose of that zone, by overlooking the significant, unrebutted evidence introduced at
trial that explains the underlying public policy of the City's zoning scheme, the court,
essentially, missed the forest for the trees.
The City's policy with respect to development in the CE-1 zone is found in four
primary sources, only one of which even was referred to by the court in its findings of
fact:
1. The Vision Statement
The City has adopted a Vision Statement which explains the City's policy with
respect to growth and development. (Ex. 14, Add. 49). The Vision Statement provides
that the City retains "a peaceful, country atmosphere through rural master planning." As
stated in the Vision Statement, the City n[e]ncourage[s] . . . [preserving the beauty of
Maple Mountain," while the City

ff

[d]iscourage[s] . . . [development on the

mountainsides."
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2. The Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element
The City implements the broad policy positions of the Vision Statement through a
document which it calls the "Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element" (hereafter
"Land Use Element"). (Ex. 1, Add. 16). The Land Use Element is an official document
of the City, reflecting the growth and development plan for the City. It was adopted by
ordinance and thus has the force of law. (Ex. 1, Add. 16). Coincidentally, the Land Use
Element was adopted in its present form on August 21, 2007, the same night and in the
same city council meeting that the PD-2 zone was adopted. (Ex. 1, Add. 16). The Land
Use Element explains, in the first paragraph of the first page under the heading "Land
Use Categories" that:
In order to create an organized and beneficial growth pattern for
future development in Mapleton City and for areas which have yet to be
annexed, the Land Use Element includes desired future land use patterns
and accounts for the impact the new development will have on the
community. It is the intention of Mapleton City to plan for these areas to
be compatible with adjacent land use patterns and existing zoning
designations. In order to do so, general land use designations have been
assigned to areas in the city . . . . Each of these designations is described in
this section and can be found on the Mapleton City Land Use Map.
(Emphasis added) (Add. 16).
After this introductory section, the Land Use Element explains that it "has been
developed to meet the following factors: 1. The Vision Statement and other citizen input
opportunities which incorporate residents1 desires] 2. Preserve rural character while
managing the growth in Mapleton; 3. Water Availability; 4. Sewer availability; and 5.
Road availability." (Emphasis added) (Add. 16).
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The Land Use Element then describes ten different land use designations and
identifies the zone classifications which fit within each land use designation. (Add. 1719). Curiously, the PD zone classification only was deemed to fit within the High
Density Residential and General Commercial land use designations and was not
considered an appropriate zone classification for the Critical Environment land use
designation. (Add. 19).
Finally, the Land Use Element, in describing the Critical Environment land use
designation, explained that:
Development of sensitive areas, such as steep slopes, flood plains, ridge
lines, aquifer recharge zones, fault zones and other areas containing
geologic hazards will be avoided to the extent possible. It is the city's
desire to transfer bench development rights to locations off the bench. If
property owners desire to develop their land rather than sell their
development rights, lots for single family homes should be at least 3 acres
in size, in order to reduce impact on the land. Building sites should be
located on geologically safe parts of each lot, and shall not include natural
slopes over thirty percent.10
3. Mapleton City General Plan 2007 Map
The Land Use Element was accompanied by the Mapleton City General Plan 2007
Map (hereafter the "General Plan Map"). (Ex. 2, Add. 20). The General Plan Map also
was adopted by ordinance on August 21, 2007. It identified in a visual format the
placement of each land use area in the City.1 x

10

Exhibit 1,1| 10 (Add. 16). Exhibit 111 demonstrates that development rights for a large
number of parcels in the CE-1 zone have been transferred to sites located elsewhere in
the City. Yet for Mr. Gibby's property the City is not encouraging transfer of
development rights off the bench.
11
For reference, the High Density Residential land use area is a copper color and is found
in small chunks near the far north and far south of the City and in a large area along the
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Read as a whole, the Land Use Element and the General Plan Map clearly identify
d ( uy purpose and policy to have any PD developments only in General Commercial and
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the environment. (Ex. 3, Add. 21). The ordinance then expressed the conclusion that
because of the fragile nature of the land in this zone, special conditions and requirements
would be attached to developments in the zone and that the requirements of the zone are
the "rninirnum required in order to accomplish the purpose and intent for which this zone
was established." (Emphasis added) (Ex. 3, Add. 21). Thus the City adopted, as a part of
the policy and purpose of the zone, absolutely needed, minimum requirements for the
zone.
Jim Lundberg testified at length regarding the textual differences between the CE1 zone and the PD-2 zone. This testimony was largely unrebutted. In his testimony Mr.
Lundberg pointed out many plain, obvious and critical differences between the two
zones. Specifically, Mr. Lundberg testified that the CE-1 zone required that minimum lot
sizes be not less than three acres; (Ex. 3, Add. 23) that building lots have minimum lot
widths of 250 feet; (Ex. 3, Add. 23) that all buildings be set back from the Bonneville
bench ridgeline at least 250 feet; (Ex. 3, Add. 24) that no structure intended for human
occupancy may be located over a fault trace or zone; (Ex. 3, Add. 25) that no grading
occur on the property without a grading permit issued by the City; (Ex. 3, Add. 29) and
that all land having a slope of 30% or greater must remain in its natural state without
grading, except the landowner could plant additional vegetation or sprinkler irrigation.
(Ex. 3, Add. 30). He also pointed out that "[i]n areas having a slope of greater than 30%,
accessory buildings such as barns [etc.] . . ." (Ex. 6. Add. 41) are permitted as conditional
uses.
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These are significant and critical minimum requirement
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3.

Does not meet the General Plan.

4.

Considered to be spot zoning.

(Ex. 28, Add. 29) (Emphasis added).
The City planning commission, an advisory body to the City Council, concluded
that the new PD-2 zone did not meet the Land Use Element and General Plan Map. This
is a clear statement by an official City commission that the purpose and policy of the new
ordinance does not fall within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1 zone.
It also buttresses the claim that the policy and purpose behind the CE-1 zone is explained
in other documents in addition to the CE-1 zone text.
Even the Mayor disclosed in correspondence to Mr. Gibby's counsel that the
hillside protections of the PD-2 zone "are culled out of the CE-1 zone. . . . Applying
them to the land with greater than 30% slope is less onerous than it would be if the CE-1
zone is applied to the remaining 60 acres of land." (Ex. 27).
Finally, Tom Nielson, a Mapleton citizen who was a member of the planning
commission at the time the City adopted the CE-1 zone, and was part of a subcommittee
assigned by the planning commission to draft the CE-1 zone (Tr. 118-19), testified that
the PD-2 zone is a significant departure from the CE-1 zone in that there was no
provision for engineering studies or fault identification or the appropriate placement of
homes. (Tr. 123).
6. PD Zone Text
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The PD-2 zone is a zone created under the imprimatur of the existing PD zone.
Thus,, consideration of whether the PD-2 zone falls within the general purpose and policy
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The (T> 1 zone allowed densities of one lot per three acres. The PD-2 zone allowed lot
sizes as small as one-half acre and an overall density of one lot per acre.

use designations which are a statement of the policy of the City. With respect to the
Critical Environment land use area, where the CE-1 zone is located, the City said that it
prefers that development rights be transferred off of the bench to other areas of the City,
that lot size should remain at three acre minimums, and that no development take place
on natural slopes over 30%.
The PD zone is described in the Land Use Element as being suitable only for High
Density Residential and General Commercial land use areas, yet the PD-2 zone is
proposed for placement in the Critical Environment land use area. Additionally, the PD
zone is not intended for areas where development is reasonably feasible under existing
zoning and it is not intended to relax zoning standards or increase densities.
Against all of these policies, the PD-2 zone is placed into a land use area not
previously designated as appropriate for PD zones; it provides for lot sizes as small as
one-half acre when the CE-1 and the Critical Environment land use area required three
acre minimum lot sizes; it skipped the salutary purpose of encouraging transfer of
development rights off of the bench area; and, completely inconsistent with all prior
policy of the City, it allowed construction of all but primary residences in the areas with
slopes greater than 30%. In short, the court was way wide of the mark in its narrowly
focused and erroneous conclusion that the PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and
policy of the CE-1 zone.
All of the foregoing evidence was admitted at trial, largely without opposition
from the other parties. Notwithstanding its admission, the trial court erred. Instead of
looking at this evidence as a whole, instead of looking at the large variety of sources of
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evidence which Mouty says should be considered in this fact-intensive analysis, the trial
court myopically concluded that the PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and policy
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Under this, part of the Marakis analysis the ti ial coi u: t is obligated to contrast the pi n pose

and policy of the zone that is being amended or replaced with the purpose and policy of
the new zone. But in making this evaluation, a trial court is not limited solely to the zone
text of the zone classification at issue. Rather it must look at all relevant evidence which
explains, expounds, and elucidates the purpose and policy of the zone at issue. In this
case, had the trial court undertaken this appropriate and broader review, it would have
reached a different result. It did not and this Court must correct that error.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision as set
forth herein.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
Appellants hereby request oral argument because it will materially assist this
Court in resolving the issues in this case.
DATED this ]b_ day of January, 2009.
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